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Using the Japanese Study of Aging and Retirement (JSTAR), a Japanese panel survey of 
people age 50 or older, we find that many Japanese in their early 50s—compared to those in 
their late 50s and early 60s—expect their level of public pension benefits to decline. We find 
that recent pension reform (which raised the pensionable age) affected people by increasing 
the age when they expect to claim their benefits by almost the exact amount for all. 
Nevertheless, the effect of reform on their expectations for future benefits remained 
insignificant. We also find evidence that anxiety about the public pension program’s future 
induces people to save more. 
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1.  Introduction 
In Japan’s rapidly aging society, as a large wave of the baby-boomer generation is reaching 
retirement age, the public pension program faces financial challenges that threaten the program’s 
solvency and benefits for future generations. To cope with the overall increase in benefits and the 
deteriorating fiscal balances, the Japanese government pursued pension reforms that raise the 
pensionable age from 60 to 65, and introduced an automatic adjustment of their benefit levels to 
allow the pension to adapt flexibly to demographic and macroeconomic changes. These reforms 
may affect non-retirees’ expectations about the quality of future public pension arrangements and, 
as a consequence, alter their savings, asset holdings, and labor supply decisions. For example, 
non-retirees may expect further delays in their pensionable age and/or reductions in their future 
benefit level.
1  They may, therefore, decide to delay retirement and save more for retirement.   
The purpose of this paper is first to investigate the effect of the pension reforms on the 
non-retirees expectations about their future public pension. This paper also examine whether the 
loss of confidence in the future public pension system induces individuals to save more for 
retirement.    In other words, we examine the substitution effect of changes in the public pension 
on private savings. 
Due to lack of data on pension expectations, there is almost no empirical study in Japan 
that examines the relationships between individuals’ subjective expectations of the future public 
pension and their decisions on savings and how long they plan to work. We utilize the Japanese 
Study of Aging and Retirement (JSTAR), a new Japanese panel survey that collects information 
on the economic, social, and health conditions of people age 50 or older. One of the unique 
characteristics of the JSTAR is that the survey questions respondents about their subjective 
                                                  
1  Since the pension benefit and contribution schemes are required by law to be reviewed at least every 
five years from the viewpoint of financial balances and their sustainability, non-retirees may fear that the 
scheme may worsen.   3 
 
probabilistic expectations of public pension benefits. By utilizing this information, we can 
measure the degree of uncertainty about public pension benefits for each respondent.
2 
Many studies report that middle-aged and older adults save excessively when compared to 
the amounts given in the life cycle hypothesis. Kotlikoff and Summers (1989) and De Nardi, 
French, and Jones (2009, 2010) show that middle-aged and older adults save a large amount for 
the following reasons: to leave a bequest to their children, to pay for expensive medical care, and 
to prepare for a longer life expectancy. In Japan, in addition to these motives, it has been pointed 
out by Horioka, Fujisaki, Watanabe, and Kouno (2000) and Horioka, Suzuki, and Hatta (2007) 
that the individuals’ perceptions that public pensions could become more unreliable are an 
important factors in explaining the high saving in Japan. The Economic Survey of Japan (2009) 
has used cross-country data to find a negative relationship between the household saving rate and 
the proportion of individuals reporting confidence about the future of their public pension. 
However, this prediction has not been tested based on individual data that have as rich 
demographic and economic information as the JSTAR. Furthermore, recent public pension 
reform may weaken the individuals’ confidence in the future public pension system and affect 
their savings decisions. However, this reform effect has not been explored yet.
3  
The Japanese pension reforms in 1994 and 2000 raised the pensionable age of the 
Employee Pension Insurance (EPI) gradually from 60 to 65 years of age (see Table 1). The EPI 
benefits consist of a flat-rate part and a wage-proportional part. For men, the pensionable age of 
the flat-rate benefit of the EPI is being raised by one year every three years from 2001 to 2013 
until the age of 65 is reached. The pensionable age for the wage-proportional benefit of the EPI 
                                                  
2  Dominitz and Manski (2006) elicit the subjective probability distribution of benefits from the 
respondents to measure the uncertainty of pension benefits. 
3  Dominitz, Manski, and Heinz (2002) simulate how social security policy may affect retirement savings. 
Delavande and Rohwedder (2011) estimate the relationship between the respondents’ uncertainty about 
their social security policy and their portfolio choice of risky and safe assets. 4 
 
will then be increased by one year every three years from 2013 to 2025 until 65 years of age is 
reached.    From 2005 to 2030, the pensionable age for women will increase in a parallel manner 
to that of men, but will lag by 5 years. Since the gradual increase in the pensionable age is based 
on birth cohorts (two or four consecutive cohorts having the identical pensionable age), we can 
exploit this policy variation to identify the effects of pension expectations on work and savings 
decisions.  
In Section 2, we review recent public pension reform and elderly employment policy in 
Japan. Section 3 describes the JSTAR data. Section 4 presents the distribution of public pension 
expectations conditional on the birth cohort. Section 5 examines the effect of the socio-economic 
characteristics on public pension expectations and also studies the effect of public pension reform 
on pension expectations. Section 6 provides estimates on the effects of public pension 
expectations on savings decisions. Section 7 concludes the paper.   
2.  Overview of Reform on Public Pension and Elderly Employment Policy in Japan 
The public old-age pension scheme in Japan is composed of three plans: (1) National Pension 
Insurance (NPI, Kokumin Nenkin) for self-employed workers and non-employed people; (2) 
Employees’ Pension Insurance (EPI, Kosei Nenkin) for those employed by private business 
corporations; and (3) Mutual Aid Insurance (MAI, Kyosai Nenkin) for those employed in the 
public sector and private schools. The NPI, EPI, and MAI cover 45.5, 48.0, and 6.5 percent of the 
population insured by public pension programs in 2007, respectively (Oshio, Shimizutani, Oishi; 
2010, 2011). Since the MAI has almost the same benefit scheme as the EPI, the MAI and the EPI 
are combined in the JSTAR questionnaire. The NPI consists only of a flat-rate benefit (the so 
called Old-Age Basic Pension, Rorei Kiso Nenkin), but the EPI consists of a two-tier benefit 
scheme: flat-rate and wage-proportional benefits. To be eligible to receive the public pension in 
Japan, one must pay a monthly premium into the plan for a minimum of 25 years. Dependent 5 
 
spouses of the EPI and MAI beneficiaries are entitled to the flat-rate benefit without paying 
contributions if their income is below the minimum taxable income.
4  
The pensionable age for the flat-rate NPI is 65 in principle.
5  On the other hand, the 
pensionable age for the flat-rate EPI had been set at age 60 since 1975 for men and since 2000 for 
women. However, pension reforms in 1994 and 2000 raised the pensionable age for the EPI’s 
flat-rate and wage-proportional benefits in stages from age 60 to 65 as presented in Table 1, Panel 
A. For male EPI beneficiaries, the pensionable age is raised in the following two stages: In the 
first stage, the pensionable age for the flat-rate EPI has been raised by one year for every three 
years from 2001 until 2013 to reach age 65. In the second stage, the pensionable age for the 
wage-proportional EPI will be raised by one year every three years beginning from 2013, and 
reaching 65 in 2025. For female EPI beneficiaries, the pensionable age will be increased with a 
lag of 5 years relative to men: i.e., the pensionable age for female EPI beneficiaries will be raised 
from 60 to 65, starting from 2006 until 2013 for the flat-rate benefit, and from 2018 until 2030 for 
the wage-proportional benefit.   
To provide stable employment for adults in their early 60s, who will no longer be eligible 
for the flat-rate EPI, the government passed the Employment Measures Law in 2004. This Law 
requires companies to ensure employment up to the pensionable age, and thus obligates 
companies to gradually raise the mandatory retirement age or to introduce a continued 
employment system from age 60 to age 65 by 2013 (as in Table 1, Panel B), or to completely 
abolish mandatory retirement. 
                                                  
4  Until 1986, the employees’ dependent spouses either contributed voluntarily to the NPI or were simply 
left uninsured (except for a survivors’ benefit). The 1986 reform put the dependent spouses under the 
public pension umbrella, although they were exempt from contributing to public pension plans. 
5  The NPI beneficiaries can opt to receive pension at any time after age 60. The pension amount varies by 
the claiming age; it is reduced when received before 65 and increased when received after 65. 6 
 
In the following sections, we examine whether these policy reforms have affected the 
non-retirees’ expectations about the public pension claiming age, benefit level, retirement, and 
savings decisions. 
3.  Data and Descriptive Statistics 
Data used in this study are the Japanese Study of Aging and Retirement (JSTAR), which is 
designed and carried out jointly by the Research Institute of Economy, Trade, and Industry 
(RIETI), Hitotsubashi University, and the University of Tokyo. The JSTAR is Japan’s first 
globally comparable panel data survey of the elderly. Its design is similar to the U.S. Health and 
Retirement Study (HRS), the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE), and 
the English Longitudinal Study of Ageing (ELSA). The JSTAR covers a wide range of 
information including: economic, social, and health conditions of middle-aged and older adults.   
The individuals in the baseline sample of JSTAR were between the ages of 50 and 75 in 
2007 and lived in five municipalities in eastern Japan: Takikawa City in Hokkaido; Sendai City 
in the Tohoku area; Adachi Ward, which is a special city in the center of the Tokyo metropolis; 
Kanazawa City in the Hokuriku area; and Shirakawa town, which is located in the mountains of 
Chubu area. Naha City, located in Okinawa, was added to the sample in 2008; and Tosu City, 
located in the Kyushu area, was added in 2009.
 6  The sample had 5,800 participants in the 
sample participated in the survey and the response rate was close to 60 percent. The second wave 
of surveys was conducted in 2009 for the baseline sample. A more detailed description of the 
survey’s design and sample is contained in Ichimura, Hashimoto, and Shimizutani (2009). 
We have restricted the JSTAR data to respondents between the ages of 50 and 65 who 
were not currently receiving public pension benefits. At the time of the interview, 2,355 
                                                  
6  The JSTAR is not a probabilistic national sampling, but seven cities selected for probabilistic sample for 
each site. 7 
 
individuals responding to the first wave of the JSTAR (5 municipalities, Naha, and Tosu) 
reported that they were not receiving public pension benefits at the time of the interview, and 
2,002 individuals indicated that they would be utilizing public pension benefits in the future. Of 
those, 8.41 percent reported that the amount of their expected future public pension benefits 
would not be reduced; 35.05 percent reported that their expected benefits would be reduced; and 
the remaining 56.55 percent reported that they did not know. It appears that many non-retirees are 
uncertain about the amount of their expected future public pension benefits. 
Table 2 gives the characteristics of our sample. Among those who plan to receive public 
pension benefits in the future, the average age is 56.7, 48.6 percent are female, 85.2 percent are 
married, and 84.3 percent are working for pay. In terms of education, 15.5 percent received less 
than a high-school degree, 45.7 percent received a high-school degree, 18.0 percent attained a 
junior college degree, and 20.6 percent earned a university degree or greater. 
4.  Expectations on Public Pension Benefits: Empirical Findings 
In this section, we provide our findings on the expectations about the public pension claiming age, 
retirement age, future public pension benefit level, and the drop in the future public pension 
benefit level, conditional on birth cohorts.    We find that the beliefs about the future of the public 
pension program demonstrate substantial uncertainty and heterogeneity. 
4.1. Expectations about the Public Pension Claiming Age and the Retirement Age 
We start by displaying the probability of the expected pension claiming age, conditional 
on fiscal year birth cohort, separately by the NPI and the EPI beneficiaries. We examine (1) 
whether there are noticeable differences in expected pension claiming age between the younger 
and the older cohorts, and (2) whether the expected pension claiming age differs across cohorts 
with different pensionable age for the EPI beneficiaries. We conduct the same analysis for the 
expected retirement age.   8 
 
Figure 1 displays the probability of the expected public pension-claiming age, conditional 
on fiscal year birth cohorts, separately by gender and by type of pension individuals are planning 
to receive.
7  The sample includes five municipalities in 2007, Naha in 2008, and Tosu in 2009. 
For men and women planning to receive the NPI, 26.8 percent of those born after 1952 did not 
know about when they would claim their pension, while 55.8 percent expected to begin receiving 
benefits at age 65. For those born before 1951, 14.6 percent did not know when they would claim 
their pension, while those expecting to receive benefits at age 65 increased to 68.6 percent. 
Therefore, in examining the older cohorts, we find that the percent of those who are undecided 
declines and that more individuals are planning to claim their pension at age 65. On the other 
hand, for men who plan to receive the EPI (and thus are likely to be affected by the pension 
reform), the 1945-1946 cohorts (where age 63 is the eligible age to claim the flat-rate benefit) are 
most likely to expect to claim their pension at age 63. The 1947-1948 cohorts (where age 64 is 
the eligible age to claim the flat-rate benefit) are most likely to claim at age 64. Much younger 
cohorts (whose eligibility for the flat-rate benefit has increased to age 65) are a mixture of those 
who expect to claim their pension at age 65 and those who do not yet know what their expected 
claiming age will be, which is much the same as the younger cohorts in the NPI sample. Similar 
to the EPI male beneficiaries, the EPI female beneficiaries are more likely to delay claiming their 
pension based on the increase in the eligibility age for the flat-rate benefit. Thus, the reform 
appears to have an impact on the pension-claiming age of both male and female EPI 
beneficiaries.  
We next examine whether individuals coordinate their decisions about when to begin 
claiming public pension benefits and when to retire (i.e., stop working). Table 3 looks at the 
relationship between the expected pension-claiming age and the expected retirement age for five 
                                                  
7  In Japan, the government’s financial year runs from April to March of the following year. 9 
 
municipalities in 2009, Naha in 2008, and Tosu in 2009.
8  Among men who are currently 
working, only 15.0 percent expect to claim their future pension benefits at about the same time 
that they retire. This low percentage is partly due to the fact that in Japan 38.9 percent expect to 
never stop working. Figure 2 displays the probability of the age at which workers expect to retire, 
conditional on fiscal year birth cohorts for the same sample as in Table 3. For those who plan to 
receive the NPI, individuals in younger cohorts expect to never stop working, but those who 
expect to retire after age 65 increases in the older cohorts. For those who plan to receive the EPI, 
individuals in younger cohorts are mixed with those who expect to never stop working and those 
who expect to retire age 60. In the older cohorts, the percent of individuals who expect to retire at 
a later age gradually increases, although a fraction of those who expect to never retire remains 
about the same. Hence, the retirement decision appears to be made independently of an 
individuals’ pension eligibility age, and also to be unaffected by pension reform. This pattern is 
clearly seen when we focus on male EPI beneficiaries who are working in jobs that have a 
mandatory retirement policy. Among this group, although 54.69 percent expect to claim their 
pension at age 65, only 24.6 percent expect to retire at age 65 and 33.8 percent expect to never 
stop working.
9 
In conclusion, the individual’s expected age of claiming public pension benefits appears 
to be unrelated to their own and spousal retirement decisions and spousal pension-claiming age. 
This is in contrast to the U.S. and European countries where the pension-claiming age usually 
coincides with the claimant’s or their spouse’s retirement decisions. Proposals to reform the 
                                                  
8  When asked about the timing of retirement in the 2007 wave, 39.4 percent reported “undecided when to 
retire.” In the 2009 survey, the respondents were given an additional option: “never expect to stop 
working,” then there was a significant drop in those who reported “undecided.” Specifically, among those 
who reported “undecided” in the 2007 wave, 54.85 percent reported “never expect to stop working” and 
22.3 percent reported “undecided” in the 2009 wave. Therefore, we restrict the sample to those who 
responded to the revised JSTAR questionnaire for expected retirement age. 
9  As for the relationship between the expected pension-claiming ages reported by both husbands and 
wives of the JSTAR sample, about half of husbands and wives expect to claim their pension when they are 
age 65. Only 14.0 percent of husbands and wives expect to claim their pensions at the same time. 10 
 
public pension – e.g., raise the full retirement age – have been found to encourage workers to 
delay their retirement in the U.S. (De Nardi, French, and Jones, 2010), but this policy reform may 
not have as large an effect on the retirement decisions in Japan as in the U.S., due to the fact that 
older Japanese workers already have quite a high work incentives. 
4.2. The Expected Public Pension Benefit Level 
Next, we next display the probability of the expected public pension benefit level. For this, 
we have information on the expected amount of public pension benefit and the expected ratio of 
the public pension benefit to pre-retirement earnings (replacement rate). 
Figure 3 displays the probability of the expected amount of the public pension benefit, 
conditional on fiscal year birth cohorts, graphed separately by gender and by type of pension that 
is planned to be received. When we compare individuals who report “don’t know” with those 
who report knowing the expected amount, those who report “don’t know” are, on average: 2.25 
years younger, 3.8 percent more likely to be female, and 4.3 percent more likely to be labor force 
participants. However, there is no noticeable difference in the educational level. In Figure 3, the 
median of the expected future public pension benefit for men (women) is 720,000 (630,000) yen 
for the NPI beneficiaries and 1,800,000 (840,000) yen for the EPI beneficiaries. The interquartile 
range of the distribution for men (women) is 400,000 (330,000) yen for the NPI beneficiaries and 
1,400,000 (852,000) yen for the EPI beneficiaries. Therefore, the expected benefit level is greater 
and more widely distributed for EPI beneficiaries than for NPI beneficiaries. For both the NPI 
and EPI beneficiaries, the median of the distribution is about the same for younger and older 
cohorts, but the interquartile range of the distribution is larger for younger cohorts than for older 
cohorts. This suggests a greater uncertainty in the amount of the expected benefit level in the 
younger cohorts. Through the pension reform, there is no significant difference in the expected 11 
 
benefit level for the EPI beneficiaries among the cohorts to which the uniform pensionable ages 
apply. 
Since the wage-proportional part of the public pension benefits is proportional to the 
pre-retirement earnings, the heterogeneity in the expected public pension benefits for the EPI 
beneficiaries presumably reflects not only the heterogeneity in the individuals’ expectations about 
the future structure of the pension system (which is subject to political reform), but also reflects 
heterogeneity in the individuals’ labor earnings to which the benefits are tied. To extract the 
former heterogeneity, we utilize the questionnaire in JSTAR, which asks about the expected ratio 
of the public pension benefit to pre-retirement earnings (replacement rate, see E-033 in the 
Appendix). Figure 4 displays the probability of the expected ratio of the public pension benefit to 
pre-retirement earnings, conditional on fiscal year birth cohorts, separately by gender and by type 
of pension an individual is planning to receive. The majority of the younger male EPI 
beneficiaries do not know their expected replacement rate, but the “don’t know” responses 
gradually decline in the older cohorts. The percent of individuals who report their expected 
replacement rate to be only 10-30 percent increases by more than 10 percent for the 1947-1948 
cohorts of male EPI beneficiaries (whose pensionable age for the wage-proportional benefit is 60) 
when compared with the 1949-1952 cohorts (whose corresponding pensionable age is 61).   
4.3. The Expected Drop in Future Public Pension Benefits 
The JSTAR has a unique question that directly asks the respondents about the subjective 
uncertainty of their future public pension benefit levels. Specifically, JSTAR inquires about the 
likelihood that the benefit level expected to be received could be reduced by 10 percent or more 
in the future (see E034 in Appendix). Figure 5 displays the responses to the expected probability 
of a more-than-10 percent decrease in the public pension benefit level, conditional on fiscal year 
birth cohorts, and listed separately by gender and by type of pension to be received. Overall, 56.1 
percent report that they do not know whether the public pension benefit will drop; and those who 12 
 
report “don’t know” are 3.5 percent more likely to be female and slightly less likely to be 
educated, but differ little in other demographic characteristics. The fraction of the respondents 
who report 0 percent chance of reduction in future pension benefit level is higher in the older 
cohorts than in the younger cohorts, while that of the respondents who report more-than-a 50 
percent chance of a 10 percent reduction is lower. Therefore, older cohorts tend to be less 
pessimistic than younger cohorts about the continuation of the structure of the public pension 
system. There appear to be no significant differences in the expected benefit level for the EPI 
beneficiaries among the consecutive cohorts to which the same pensionable ages apply through 
the pension reform. 
In conclusion, there is substantial uncertainty and heterogeneity in beliefs about the future 
of the public pension program. Younger cohorts are less confident than older cohorts about future 
public pension benefits. They report greater probability of decline in future public pension 
benefits and more provide “don’t know” responses about their future public pension expectations. 
There are also differences between the NPI and the EPI beneficiaries in their expectations on 
public pensions. The EPI beneficiaries are affected by the pension reform and they have more of 
a picture of the future of the public pension program.   
5.  Public Pension Expectations and Pension Reform 
In this section, we use regression framework to (1) analyze the determinants of the public pension 
expectations and retirement expectations and (2) assess the effect of the pension reform on the 
public pension expectations and retirement expectations. 
5.1. Expectations on Public Pension Benefits: Estimation Results 
In Section 5.1, we analyze the relationship between public pension expectations and 
socio-economic variables. Table 4 presents estimates of the effect of socio-economic 
characteristics on various measures of public pension expectations. These characteristics are: age, 13 
 
gender, marital status, education, labor market experience, work status, health status, asset, 
income, chance to survive until age 75 divided by life table probability, city, and calendar years. 
When the dependent variable is continuous, the OLS estimates are shown. When the dependent 
variable is binary, the probit estimates of marginal effects evaluated at the mean value of the 
variable are shown. The sample includes five municipalities in 2007 and 2009, Naha in 2008, and 
Tosu in 2009, if not stated otherwise. 
In Table 4, Column 1, we provide the estimated effects on the plan to receive public 
pensions. We find that age is not an important predictor of the likelihood of receiving a public 
pension in the future. To be eligible to receive the public pension in Japan, one must pay a 
monthly premium into the plan for a minimum of 25 years, so the labor market participants and 
those who have more than a high school education (and thus have better employment potential) 
are more likely to have a greater probability of receiving a public pension in the future. There is 
no significant difference between men and women in the probability of receiving a public pension. 
This may be because as dependent spouses, women have the right to receive an allowance added 
to their husbands’ pensions. Those who expect a greater chance of surviving until age 75 are 
likely to be prepared to receive public pension benefits in the future. 
In Table 4, Column 2, we present the estimated effect on the expected pension-claiming 
age. Individuals who are more educated (junior college or university and over) are more likely to 
expect to claim their public pension at an older age, while those who are in their late 50s (relative 
to those in early 50s), female, and those who are less healthy are more likely to expect to claim 
pension at a younger age. In Table 4, Column 3, we present the estimated effect on the expected 
retirement age. Individuals in their late 50s and early 60s (relative to those in early 50s) are more 
likely to expect to retire at a later age. Individuals in their late 50s plan to claim their public 
pension at a younger age, but they expect to stop working at a later age, indicating that for this 
group the public pension benefits are likely to be insufficient to maintain their living standards. 14 
 
Those who have less employment potential (less income and less than high-school education) 
expect to retire at a later age. Also, those who expect a greater chance of surviving until age 75 
expect to retire at a later age.   
In Table 4, Columns 4 and 5, the estimated effects on the expected amount of the public 
pension benefit and the expected replacement ratio are presented, respectively. We find that 
individuals in their late 60s (relative to those in early 50s) expect to receive 69,740 yen more in 
public pension benefits, but the expected replacement ratio does not vary much by age.   
In Table 4, Column 6, we present the estimated effect on the expected probability of 
more-than-10 percent drop in the future public pension benefits. As the question is only asked of 
the respondents and not their spouses, the sample size drops to 1148. The coefficient on those 
ages 60-65 is negative, suggesting that (1) individuals in their early 60s are much more confident 
of the continuation of the public pension system than those in their early 50s, and (2) individuals 
who are closer to claiming their public pension are able to perform more accurate pension 
calculations (Gustman and Steinmeier, 2005). Labor market participants are more likely to expect 
a drop in their future public pension benefits, as they may choose to work to guard against the 
decline in their future public pension.   
5.2. The Effect of Pension Reforms on Expectations of Public Pension Benefits 
In this section, we evaluate the effect of pension reforms on individual expectations by 
utilizing a regression discontinuity design that exploits month of birth cutoff to determine the 
individuals’ pensionable ages.   
We examine whether there was a discrete change in public pension expectations on either 
side of the fixed threshold which is April 2 of those birth years affected by the reform (see Table 
1, Panel A). That is, in a particular reform year, the pensionable age for the EPI beneficiaries 
whose birth date is before April 1 is shorter by one year than those whose birth date is later than 
April 2. In contrast, in the year when there is no reform, the pensionable age will remain the same 15 
 
for all individuals, regardless of their birth date. Thus, we can conduct a regression discontinuity 
analysis to estimate the effect of pension reform on public pension expectations, by interacting a 
dummy for planning to receive Employee Pension Insurance ( i EPI ), a dummy for the reform 
year ( i REFORM ), and a dummy for birth date later than April 2 ( 2i BIRTH ). Specifically, we 
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where  i y   is the measures of public pension expectations, and  i X  is  the  covariates 
(socio-economic variables) as used in Table 4. The coefficient  1    reflects the reform effect on 
the public pension expectations.
10  Note that in this analysis we assume that people do not change 
beneficiaries between the EPI and the NPI as a consequence of the reform.   
Table 5 presents the estimation results. When we estimate Equation (1), we do not simply 
compare those born before April 2 with those born after April 2. Instead, we keep those born 
before April 2 as the reference category, but separate those born after April 2 to: (1) those born 
between April 2 to June 30 (2
nd quarter), (2) those born between July 1 to September 31 (3
rd 
quarter), and (3) those born between October 1 to December 31 (4
th quarter). Thus,  2i BIRTH  is 
composed of 2
nd quarter, 3
rd quarter, and 4
th quarter dummies.   
In Table 5, Column 1, we find that pension reform induces people to raise their expected 
pension-claiming age by 1.170 (.457) years for those born in the 2
nd quarter (relative to those 
born in the 1
st quarter who are unaffected by the reform), by 1.178 (.451) years for those born in 
the 3
rd quarter, and by 1.068 (.445) years for those born in the 4
th quarter. Therefore, the EPI 
                                                  
10  This framework is similar to Bottazzi et al. (2006) which studies how expected retirement age and 
expected replacement rate have been affected by the Italian pension reform. 16 
 
beneficiaries are fully informed about the reform, and those affected by the reform respond by 
expecting to delay their pension claiming age by exactly one year. In Table 5, Column 2, the 
effect of pension reform on expected retirement age is reported. The pension reform raises the 
retirement age by .430 (1.759) years for those born in the 2
nd quarter, -.996 (1.520) years for 
those born in the 3
rd quarter, and .0145 (1.346) years for those born in the 4
th quarter. The reform 
effect on retirement age is small and insignificant, and it appears that retirement decision is 
independent of pension reform.   
According to the estimation results in Table 5 Column 3, people expect that due to the 
pension reform their future public pension benefit will drop by 280,000 yen per year for those 
born in the 2
nd quarter, drop by 620,000 yen per year for those born in the 3
rd quarter, but increase 
by 240,000 yen per year for those born in the 4
th quarter. The reform effect on those born in the 
3
rd quarter is especially large in magnitude, amounting to a nearly 50 percent drop in their 
expected public pension benefit (as the median of the expected public pension benefit for the EPI 
beneficiaries is 1,200,000 yen). However, these estimates are noisy, and the sign for those born in 
the 4
th quarter goes the opposite direction. Next, the reform effect on the expected replacement 
ratio is reported in Table 5, Column 4. We find a positive but small and insignificant reform 
effect, which is inconsistent with the negative effect on pension benefit level in Table 5, Column 
3.  
We conclude that the reform has noticeable effect on raising pension claiming age, but the 
results are inconclusive regarding the effect of pension reform on the expected public pension 
benefit levels. 
6.  The Effects of Expectations of Pension Benefits on Savings 
We examine how individuals’ expectations about the future of the public pension benefit affect 
their savings decisions.   17 
 
Our empirical specification is: 
, ii i i PS y X       (2) 
where  i PS   is the private saving variable,  i y   is the measures on public pension expectations,   
i X   is the covariates as used in Table 4, and  i    is the error term. The key coefficient of interest 
is   , which reflects the effect of public pension expectations on private savings.   
The above specification is based on the model which reflects the relationship between 
public pension-benefit wealth (PBWi) and private savings (PSi): 
. ii i i PS PBW X       (3) 
where  0     because of the substitution effect of public pension wealth (PBWi) on private 
savings (PSi).  
We define the public pension wealth (PBWi) as follows: the present value of the expected 
future public pension benefits that will be received from the expected pension claiming age to the 
maximum length of life where the discount factor is composed of survival probability and interest 


















     
 
(4) 
where  i    is the planned amount of benefits ,  i N   is the expected pension claiming age,  T  is 
the maximum length of life ,  i    is the survival probability, and  r   is the real interest rate. The 
variables  i  ,  i N , and  i    can be obtained from the JSTAR, as  i    can be substituted as the 
expected amount of public pension benefit (or the expected replacement ratio),  i N  as  the 
expected pension claiming age, and  i    as the expected chance to survive. 18 
 
The individuals’ expectations of benefits amounts    ii E    can be calculated as follows. 
Let  i p   denote the subjective probability that the public pension benefit could be reduced by 
more-than-10 percent in the future, which is also available in the JSTAR questionnaire (E034 in 
Appendix).    We then can show that the expected amount of benefits    ii E    has a lower bound 
of   0.9 1 ii p     and an upper bound of    10 . 1 ii p   , because: 
      
  
0, 0.9 0.9 ,  1  
           0.9 1 ,  1 0.1  .







   
(5) 
In Equations (4) and (5), it is straightforward to argue that the planned public pension  i   
positively affects PBWi, but the expected pension claiming age  i N  negatively  affects  PBWi.  In 
addition, the upper and lower bounds of the expected amount of benefits   ii E    is negatively 
affected by  i p . Therefore, for simplicity, let us linearly approximate Equations (4) and (5) as: 
01 2 3 . i ii i i i PBW N p u X           (6) 
where  i    is included in  i X . We predict that  1 0   ,  2 0   , and  3 0   . Next, plug Equation 
(6) into Equation (3) and obtain:   
12 3 . ii i i i i PS N p X           (7) 
Note that since  0   , the expected signs of the coefficients are:  1 0   ,  2 0   , and  3 0   .   
Equation (7) equals to Equation (2) when    ,, ii i i yN p   .  
In Table 6, we estimate the reduced form private savings equation (Equation (7)). The 
dependent variable  i PS   is a logarithm of the respondents’ final saving goals which can be 19 
 
obtained from the JSTAR.
11 The  covariates  i X   are the same as those in Table 4. The OLS 
estimates are reported in the first three columns of Table 6. In the specification in Column 1, 
which includes only  i p   as the measure on public pension expectations, the effect of the 
probability of expecting a more-than-10 percent drop in future benefit is significantly positive. 
This implies that that those who expect a decline in future public pension benefits plan to save 
more. The specification in Column 3 includes the variables  i    (expected replacement ratio), 
i N , and  i p   as the measures of public pension expectations. A 10 percentage decline in the 
expected probability of more-than-10 percent decline in pension benefit raises the private savings 
goal by 7.9 percent, although the effect is insignificant.    Those who report that they do not know 
whether their future benefits would decline save significantly more. Although effects are 
insignificant, those who plan to have a larger replacement ratio save less, as do those who expect 
to claim their pension later. Therefore, the signs on the coefficients  i p   and  i    are as we 
hypothesized in Equation (7), but the sign on the coefficient  i N   is not in the expected direction. 
The OLS estimates may be biased if the expectation about their public pension claiming 
age and the error term of private saving equation are correlated. In particular, individuals who opt 
to receive pensions after their pensionable ages may plan to retire later and thus save less.
12 To 
solve such an endogeneity problem, we use pension reform as a source of exogenous variation of 
the expected pension claiming age. Specifically, we use as instruments: the interaction between a 
                                                  
11  There are two reasons as to why we use the respondents’ final savings goals to represent their private 
savings (PS) in Equation (7). First, both the final savings goal and the private pension wealth (PBW) are 
the expected values. Second, while the PBW is the present value at the pension claiming age, the final 
savings goal is usually considered to be the amount the respondents are planning to save by their pension 
claiming age; thus, in Equation (3), we assume that the PS and the PBW are measured at about the same 
time.  
12  Since the benefit formula for the wage-proportional part is based on the average total earnings and the 
length of insured (working) period, the respondents who expect a larger amount of future benefits may 
have a larger savings because they obtained greater earnings. Therefore, we control earnings as covariates 
in Equation (7). 20 
 
dummy for planning to receive the Employer Pension Insurance ( i EPI ), a dummy for the reform 
year ( i REFORM ), and a dummy for birth date later than April 1 ( 2i BIRTH ), which are used as 
independent variables in Equation (1).
13  Note that pension reform has a positive impact in 
delaying the expected pension claiming age, and thus can be used as instruments for the expected 
pension claiming age. In the last two columns in Table 6, we report the IV estimates. In Column 
5, the sign of coefficient of pension claiming age is now the same as that predicted in Equation 
(7), although all the effects are insignificant except among those individuals who report “don’t 
know,” where they have a positive and significant effect on savings. We obtain similar results 
when we use the amount of expected public pension benefit to represent  i  . 
Therefore, we conclude that those who “don’t know” whether their future benefits would 
decline would significantly increase their final savings goal. We only find weak evidence that (1) 
a reported drop in expectations about the future public pension benefit has a positive effect on the 
individual’s private savings goal, (2) a decrease in pension benefit levels has positive effect on 
private savings goal, and (3) an increase in pension claiming age has positive effect on private 
savings goal. 
7.  Conclusion 
Using the Japanese Study of Aging and Retirement (JSTAR), we find that many Japanese in their 
early 50s do not believe that public pension benefits will be there for them when they retire. We 
also find that the anxiety about the public pension program’s future might induce people to save 
more. Restoring balance to the public pension could reduce the long-term deficit and make 
                                                  
13  We assume that the actual pension benefit changes exogenously, and that the EPI beneficiaries did not 
switch jobs nor become NPI beneficiaries to offset the impact of the pension reform on their savings.   
Bottazzi et al. (2008) estimate the substitution effect of pension wealth on private wealth by using 
dummies for post Italian pension reform period and employment groups as instruments.   21 
 
people feel more secure about their retirement. Therefore, it is possible that eliminating the public 
pension shortfall could reduce the misplaced fear that causes Japanese to over-save.     
  22 
 
Appendix: Questionnaire regarding Pension Expectations 
First wave, 2007, 5 Cities 
 
(1)  E-028. In the future do you expect to receive any further public pension? 
1.  Yes 
2.  No 
3.  Don’t know 
4.  Refused to answer 
If answer to E-028 was 1, go to E-030; otherwise, go to E-029-1 (Benchmark: spouse present). 
 
(2)  E-030. What type of pension is it? Please select the most appropriate choice from the 
following. 
1. National Pension Plan (basic old-age pension) 
2. Old age welfare annuity or retirement mutual pension (including basic pension) 
3. Survivor’s pension 
4. Disability pension 
5. Don’t know 
6. Refused to answer 
Regardless of answer, go to E-031. 
 
(3)  E-031. At what age do you expect to begin receiving that pension? 
1. Age: 
2. Don’t know 
3. Refused to answer 
Regardless of answer, go to E-032. 
 
(4)  E-032. About how much do you expect to receive per year before taxes? If you don’t mind, 
please tell me the total amount that will be deposited to your bank or postal account. 
1. Approximately ____ yen 
2. Don’t know 
3. Refused to answer 
Regardless of answer, go to E-033. 
 
(5)  E-033. About what percent of your last working salary does that amount to? If you did not 
work before, please say so. 
1. ____%   
2. Did not work 
3. Don’t know 
4. Refused to answer 
Regardless of answer, go to E-034. 
 
(6)  E-034. Do you think it is likely that the amount you expect to receive could be reduced by 
10% or more in the future? If you don’t think this is possible, please say so. 23 
 
1. ____ % 
2. No possibility 
3. Don’t know 
4. Refused to answer 
Regardless of answer, go to E-035-1. 
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1941.4.2‐1943.4.1 2001 65 61 60
1943.4.2‐1945.4.1 2004 65 62 60
1945.4.2‐1947.4.1 2007 65 63 60
1947.4.2‐1949.4.1 2010 65 64 60
1949.4.2‐1953.4.1 2013 65 65 60
1953.4.2‐1955.4.1 2013 65 65 61
1955.4.2‐1957.4.1 2016 65 65 62
1957.4.2‐1959.4.1 2019 65 65 63
1959.4.2‐1961.4.1 2022 65 65 64
1961.4.2‐ 2025 65 65 65
Women
1946.4.2‐1948.4.1 2006 65 61 60
1948.4.2‐1950.4.1 2009 65 62 60
1950.4.2‐1952.4.1 2012 65 63 60
1952.4.2‐1954.4.1 2015 65 64 60
1954.4.2‐1958.4.1 2015 65 65 60
1958.4.2‐1960.4.1 2018 65 65 61
1960.4.2‐1962.4.1 2021 65 65 62
1962.4.2‐1964.4.1 2024 65 65 63
1964.4.2‐1966.4.1 2027 65 65 64

















Mean SD Min Max 25th perc. Median 75th perc.
Age 56.69 3.644 50 65 54 57 59
F e m a l e 0 . 4 8 6 0 . 5 0 0 01001
Married 0.852 0.355 01111
Less than high s c h o o l 0 . 1 5 5 0 . 3 6 2 01000
High s c h o o l 0 . 4 5 7 0 . 4 9 8 01001
Junior c o l l e g e 0 . 1 8 0 0 . 3 8 5 01000
University or m o r e 0 . 2 0 6 0 . 4 0 4 01000
ADL Disability 0.098 0.297 01000
Income 571.2 539.3 0 11650 280 500 760
Asset 641.2 1360.1 0 16100 0 150 700
Currently working for p a y 0 . 8 4 3 0 . 3 6 4 01111
Labor market experience 26.50 13.26 0 50 17 31 37
Chance to survive until age 75 divided by life table probability 1.020 0.342 0 1.400 0.834 1.131 1.292
Plan to Receive National Pension Insurance ( N P I ) 0 . 3 6 8 0 . 4 8 2 01001
Plan to Receive Employer Pension Insurance ( E P I ) 0 . 6 1 7 0 . 4 8 6 01011
Expected public pension claiming age 63.78 2.205 60 72 62 65 65
Expected amount of public pension benefit 105.2 86.17 0 500 48 80 150
Expected replacement ratio 4.335 4.747 0 50 3 3 5





60 61‐64 65 66‐69 70 71‐75 Don’t 
Know
Total
50‐59 0 0 0.0049 0000 0.0049
60 0 0 0.0099 0 0 0 0.0049 0.0148
61‐64 0 0 0.0197 0000 0.0197
65 0.0099 0.0049 0.0887 0 0.0049 0 0.0049 0.1133
66‐69 0 0 0.0099 0 0 0 0.0049 0.0148
70 0.0049 0 0.0197 0 0 0 0.0099 0.0345
71‐75 0 0.0049 0.0099 0 0 0 0.0099 0.0246
76‐100 00000000
Never 0.0345 0.0099 0.3744 0.0049 0.0148 0 0.1330 0.5714
Undecided 0.0099 0 0.1133 0 0 0 0.0690 0.1921
Don’t Know 0000 0.0049 0 0.0049 0.0099





60 61‐64 65 66‐69 70 71‐75 Don’t 
Know
Total
50‐59 0.0016 0.0032 0.0128 0 0 0 0.0032 0.0207
60 0.0207 0.0096 0.0574 0.0016 0 0 0.0303 0.1196
61‐64 0.0064 0.0112 0.0271 0 0 0 0.0064 0.0510
65 0.0223 0.0175 0.1132 0.0016 0 0 0.0383 0.1930
66‐69 0.0032 0.0016 0.0128 0.0016 000 0.0191
70 0.0048 0.0048 0.0191 0 0 0 0.0016 0.0303
71‐75 0.0016 0 0.0032 0 0 0.0016 0.0016 0.0080
76‐100 000000 0.0016 0.0016
Never 0.0638 0.0255 0.1691 0.0016 0.0032 0 0.0797 0.3429
Undecided 0.0287 0.0080 0.0941 0 0.0016 0 0.0478 0.1802
Don’t Know 0.0064 0.0016 0.0080 0 0.0016 0 0.0159 0.0335






60 61‐64 65 66‐69 70 71‐75 Don’t 
Know
Total
50‐59 0.0030 0 0.0030 0 0 0 0.0120 0.0181
60 0.0120 0 0.0392 0 0 0 0.0151 0.0663
61‐64 0.0030 0.0060 0.0211 0000 0.0301
65 0.0151 0.0030 0.0813 0.0030 0.0030 0 0.0090 0.1145
66‐69 0.0030 0 0 0 0 0 0.0030 0.0060
70 00000 0 0.0030 0.0030
71‐75 000000 0.0030 0.0030
76‐100 00000000
Never 0.0693 0.0030 0.2952 0 0.0120 0 0.0904 0.4699
Undecided 0.0151 0 0.1355 0 0 0 0.0572 0.2078
Don't Know 0.0120 0 0.0422 0 0 0 0.0271 0.0813





60 61‐64 65 66‐69 70 71‐75 Don’t 
Know
Total
50‐59 0.0233 0.0026 0.0233 0 0 0 0.0052 0.0543
60 0.0336 0.0129 0.1111 0 0 0 0.0362 0.1938
61‐64 0.0103 0.0026 0.0103 0000 0.0233
65 0.0310 0.0155 0.0491 0 0 0 0.0258 0.1214
66‐69 0 0 0.0052 0 000 0.0052
70 0.0026 0 0.0026 0 0 0 0.0026 0.0078
71‐75 000000 0.0026 0.0026
76‐100 00000000
Never 0.0956 0.0362 0.1085 0.0026 0.0026 0 0.0853 0.3307
Undecided 0.0310 0.0078 0.0904 0 0.0026 0 0.0465 0.1783
Don't Know 0.0181 0.0026 0.0310 0 0 0 0.0310 0.0827
Total 0.2274 0.0775 0.4005 0.0026 0.0052 0 0.2041 387
Age Plan to Receive Public Pension
Age Plan to Receive Public PensionTable 4: Estimates of Public Pension Expectations
0.015 ‐0.434 ** 1.860 ** 3.805 ‐0.256 ‐1.681
(0.010) (0.105) (0.304) (7.698) (0.452) (1.898)
0.001 ‐0.006 3.959 ** 6.974 ‐0.371 ‐10.524 **
(0.012) (0.118) (0.336) (8.613) (0.414) (2.240)
0.016 ‐0.588 ** ‐1.900 ** ‐58.270 ** 0.576 0.918
(0.011) (0.107) (0.291) (6.928) (0.453) (2.113)
0.025 * 0.290 ** ‐1.733 0.348 4.962 **
(0.013) (0.116) (5.347) (0.387) (2.312)
0.001 ‐0.006 0.005 0.086 ‐0.017 ‐0.007
(0.004) (0.013) (0.207) (0.025) (0.079)
0.001 ** ‐0.003 ‐0.013 ‐0.124 ‐0.005 0.009
(0.002) (0.010) (0.108) (0.004) (0.038)
0.002 0.004 ‐0.053 * 1.830 ** ‐0.084 ** ‐0.371 **
(0.002) (0.010) (0.031) (0.685) (0.033) (0.186)
0.031 ** 0.150 0.944 ** 4.373 ‐0.235 ‐4.170
(0.016) (0.162) (0.404) (8.914) (0.439) (2.687)
0.058 ** ‐0.173 ‐0.077 11.535 0.630 ** 5.472 **
(0.018) (0.151) (0.440) (8.534) (0.300) (2.211)
‐0.032 ** 0.012 0.853 ** ‐15.720 ** 0.528 ‐0.339
(0.015) (0.117) (0.404) (6.100) (0.609) (1.988)
0.010 0.295 ** 0.446 14.111 * ‐0.089 ‐1.423
(0.012) (0.115) (0.351) (8.064) (0.316) (2.327)
‐0.001 0.492 ** 0.394 10.780 0.256 0.751
(0.013) (0.123) (0.340) (9.739) (0.420) (2.454)
‐1.247 ** ‐1.714 ** 48.252 ** 0.598 * 1.870
(0.089) (0.299) (5.573) (0.315) (1.673)
‐0.036 ** 0.390 ** ‐0.012 18.880 ** 0.561 10.219 **
(0.016) (0.135) (0.402) (9.207) (0.519) (2.672)
0.057 ** 0.669 ** 0.180 6.743 1.038 ** 2.360
(0.013) (0.145) (0.387) (8.180) (0.403) (3.446)
0.048 ** 0.763 ** ‐0.083 4.416 0.871 ‐7.772 **
(0.013) (0.143) (0.390) (10.982) (0.652) (2.100)
0.003 0.268 * 1.092 ** ‐3.227 0.524 ‐2.489
(0.016) (0.147) (0.397) (7.894) (0.520) (2.455)
‐0.126 ** 0.084 ‐0.823 4.023 0.959 8.294 **
(0.025) (0.168) (0.549) (9.852) (0.799) (2.944)
‐0.122 0.592 ** ‐0.876 1.333 0.328 ‐12.202 **
(0.039) (0.248) (0.538) (11.952) (0.544) (4.287)
‐0.020 ** ‐0.192 ** ‐0.368 3.615 ‐0.289 1.813
(0.010) (0.089) (0.252) (6.226) (0.347) (1.635)
0.002 ‐0.424 ** 0.728 ‐6.035 ‐0.609 1.073
(0.015) (0.154) (0.535) (7.661) (0.372) (2.379)





















































TosuTable 5: Effect of Public Pension Reform
Independent Variables
1.170 ** 0.430 ‐6.310 0.914 ‐35.247
1.178 ** ‐0.996 ‐10.556 0.544 ‐57.208 *
1.068 ** 0.145 3.153 1.116 17.933

























0.0117 ** 0.0062 0.0069 0.0055 0.0065
0.6797 ** 0.6372 ** 0.5345 ** 0.6049 ** 0.5233 **





2 644 686 644 686 789
(0.2452) (0.2368)
0.6393 0.6569 0.6672 0.6494 0.6649
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